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Review-Interview with Roger Cooter
The Critical Intellectual in the Age of Neoliberal
Hegemony
Pietro Daniel Omodeo *
is presentation of Roger Cooter’s and Claudia Stein’s recent volume (Writing
History in the Age of Biomedicine, NewHaven and London: Yale University Press,
) is divided into two sections. e ﬁrst part will oﬀer an overview of their most
challenging views. e second consists in a series of questions related to the claims
of the book. Roger Cooter kindly agreed to reply to them.
1. Presentation of the Volume
“ere is never an escape from the historical a priori” (). is moo well
synthesizes the problematic addressed by Roger Cooter inWriting History in the
Age of Biomedicine, a collection of essays about medical historiography and sci-
entiﬁc culture today, many of which were wrien in collaboration with Claudia
Stein. Cooter reﬂects on the state of the art in medical history, reconstructing
the shis in the approaches and in the leading theoretical questions from the
s up to the present. At the same time, he diagnoses the diseases aﬀect-
ing research, from neo-liberal complicity to fundraising strategies and, most
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worryingly, neopositivistic tendencies toward the ahistorical naturalization of
scientiﬁc results.
Cooter does not address these issues in the form of a detached analysis.
Rather, he is oen openly polemical. I dare say that criticism is the ﬁl rouge
running through this work. Many essays are genuinely satirical in the classi-
cal sense. ey are aacks against the (moral, theoretical, ideological) vices
of scholarship (conformism, naivety, opportunism). Cooter urges intellectu-
als to abandon their ivory towers and revitalize history writing (and them-
selves!) in the direction of critical and political engagement. is step, he ar-
gues, has become necessary to rescue historiography from the blind alleys of
self-referentiality and abstraction threatening the very meaning and existence
of the discipline.
1.1. A Meta-Meta Perspective
evolume has amulti-layered structure. At ﬁrst glance it appears to be a col-
lection of papers: they were mostly wrien in the last ﬁeen years (apart from
Chapter Two, “Anticontagionism and History’s Medical Record,” which dates
back to the late s) and some of them are co-authored with Claudia Stein (in
particular those on visual culture). However, the volume is not a mere juxtapo-
sition. e chapters are connected by a narrative (that I shall discuss in detail),
which ﬁrst emerges from the ﬁrst, programmatic chapter and then is continued
in introductory notes, at the beginning of each section. All chapters are in fact
preceded by long assessments of their biographical-historical meaning.
e complexity of Cooter’s volume is inherent to his kaleidoscopic approach.
He is not focusing on history per se but rather on two diﬀerent meta-levels. e
ﬁrst one concerns historiography, that is, the critical reviewing of debates on
medical history and the evaluation of the implicit agendas towhich the involved
historians adhere. e second level is a meta-meta-exploration of the cultural
and political drives behind conﬂicting historiographical approaches.
Chapter Two, for instance, illustrates thismulti-dimensionality through schol-
arly discussion about ᵗʰ-century anticontagionism. e signiﬁcance of the
seminal article on this topic, wrien by Ackerknecht of the s, rests with
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its theoretical aﬃrmation that medical debates are oen and largely social de-
bates ().¹emost important implication, reaching far beyond Ackerknecht’s
original intentions, is that ideology does not aﬀect only failed science. Rather,
all theorization is “socially informed”. ese theoretical presuppositions open
up a perspective and a methodology, which cannot be dismissed on the ba-
sis of ad hoc empirical refutations alone. Cooter argues that recent debates on,
and opposition to Ackerknecht’s thesis—in spite of their historical exactitude
and scrupule—are in eﬀect forms of conservative revisionism of the historical
methodology he launched.
1.2. Escaping the Fatal Turn
In Cooter’s reconstruction, the tortuous developments of medical history in
recent years have been marked by disciplinary internalistization, that is, a bias
toward self-referentiality loosing contact with society and the aenuation of
the historian’s ethical and political engagement.is tendency—contrary to the
Marxist s and s, Cooter argues—came with the shi from the “social” to the
“cultural” register in the ’s (discussed in Chapter ree). e absorption of
the former by the laer was in fact a dematerializing and “depoliticizing thrust”
(). “Where had the political boom of history-writing disappeared?”—Cooter
asks (). According to his reconstruction, the discipline has gone through sev-
eral turns in the last  years (social, cultural, somatic, spatial, visual), one fol-
lowing the next in rapid succession. e last metamorphosis, the neurological
turn marked by the biologization of epistemology and of knowledge history
(discussed in the concluding Chapter Ten) does (so far, without detection) un-
dermine the foundations of the discipline, since neo-positivistic ideas are erod-
ing the theoretical premises for historiography itself.
¹ E. H. Ackerknecht, “Anticontagionism between  and ,” in Bulletin of the History of
Medicine  (): pp. -.
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e dangers of the present conjuncture are pointed out in Chapter One, sig-
niﬁcantly titled “e End of History-Writing?” e focus is neurological sci-
entism and its penetration into historiography at the expense of the discipline
itself.is novel trend is mystifying insofar as it spreads the “belief that the new
knowledge provides an innovative tool for digging deeper into the understand-
ing of ourselves and our past” (). Consequently, science is converted from the
object of critical assessment into a presupposition for inquiry, in particular for
philosophical and historical assessments. In this manner, the history of science
becomes a harmless corollary of neuroscience (as fundamental knowledge the-
ory) and does not unfold its potentiality as a critical instrument directed against
epistemological naturalization, objectivation, and the fetishism of facts and of
present-day explanations.
e fatal neuro-shi Cooter is describing especially originates from schol-
ars’ parasitism of aboundantly ﬁnanced biological and neurological research,
as well as from lighthearted acceptance of the hegemonic discourse behind it.
It substitutes critical thought for a celebration of the status quo (political and
cultural). According to this perspective, the alliance between cognitive neuro-
sciences and historiography is a surrender of the laer. Satisfaction with (per-
haps resignation to?) what is given takes the place of reﬂection. us, against
bad interdisciplinarity—that subordinating history to neuroscience—Cooter ap-
peals to disciplinary historicity. History writing as a critical practice appears to
be the only way out of “e New Poverty of eory” as the title of Chapter Ten
goes (echoing Edward P. ompson echoing Karl Marx on Proudhon). In fact,
to quote the concluding words of the volume, we are in “a time when the season
for turning is past” ().
1.3. Criticism in History, Criticism as History
In the face of recent neo-positivistic tendencies, Cooter urges a rehabilitation
of critical historiography or, beer to say, the reaﬃrmation of history writing
as critical thought. Cooter argues that this is not only desirable, but even neces-
sary to the survival of the history of science. e more so, since this discipline
possesses the right conceptual tools for the job of undoing ahistorical scientism.
Historians of science and medicine can best serve society by puing science in
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perspective and revealing its socio-cultural and political entanglements. us,
they must denounce the speciﬁc ideology of our times in which science plays
the role of “a source of [meta-cultural] autonomous power, without being rec-
ognized as such” ().
According to Cooter, the reﬂection on epistemological a priori cannot and
shall not be restricted to the past as the object of historical research. Rather,
it primarily concerns the writer and her/his scholarly activity. From this view-
point, Cooter’s questioning of the socio-cultural and political changes that cor-
respond to the disciplinary turns of recent years, also has a self-critical import.
In truth, it is not easy to unveil the epistemological frameworks according to
which the discipline has been encapsulated and immunized against criticism,
as inside an isolating “whale’s belly” (Chapter Eight, quoting George Orwell).
e diﬃculty mainly rests in the fact that ideology is not just the a priori of the
others. To unveil it, self-reﬂection as a form of informed criticism is required.
Chapters Seven and Eight discuss two examples of lack of criticism in his-
toriography. e target of Chapter Seven is “retrospective diagnosis:” Could
Ramses have died of “tuberculosis,” a not yet discovered disease? Could the me-
dieval astronomer al-Kindībe the author of a “Lost Treatise on Observations of
Halley’s Comet in A.D. ” (to mention the title of a recent article)? In order
to stress the paradox of retrospective diagnosis, Cooter quotes Bruno Latour
observing that “transplanting into the past the hidden or potential existence
of the future” is “comparable to accepting that a person two thousand years
ago could have been killed by ‘a Marxist upheaval, or a machine gun, or a Wall
Street crash’” (-). It is an illusion that the modern determination of dis-
eases of the past can help history, since it disguises an ahistorical approach to
the past whose function, in the end, is only to celebrate present knowledge.
For similar reasons, Cooter criticizes (Chapter Eight)e Cambridge World His-
tory of Medical Ethics, for dealing with the history of bioethics not as a his-
torically emergent discipline but rather as a meta-historical category, as if it
always existed sub specie aeternitatis. Such neo-Platonic supra-temporal real-
ism (so to say) consists in a hindsight projection of a subsidiary discipline of
today’s medicine. is misrepresentation hinders an appropriate historical in-
quiry into the (socio-cultural) factors accounting for the constitution and aﬃr-
mation of bioethics, and for the economical and political support it received in
recent years.
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1.4. A Gramscian Past
Cooter depicts his own “conceptual-cum-epistemic journey” as “the Werde-
gang of a social and cultural historian of ideas in science and medicine who has
moved […] from a broadly neo-Marxian to a broadly neo-Foucauldian iden-
tity” (xii). Especially in the ﬁrst chapter, he looks back to the leist origins
of the critical history of science. At those times, the “theorist of hegemony,”
Antonio Gramsci shone as a “pole star” (-). His anti-reductionist and anti-
deterministic views oﬀered a philosophical and political underpinning for Cooter’s
e Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization of
Consent in Nineteenth-Century Britain () (the Gramscian accent being put
on the subtitle).
Although Cooter tends to present neo-Marxist concepts as outdated—lost in
the turn of the s—Gramscian elements are still visible in his work. Among
them, the most evident are the reﬂection on intellectual activity as intrinsi-
cally political, the refusal to subordinate culture and politics to economy and,
at the same time, the aention to the mediation of socio-economical relations
through theory (a contemporary instance would be neoliberal managerialism
taking hold of Academia). Also the emphasis on self-awareness as reﬂexive
clariﬁcation of ideology is reminiscent of the earlier Cooter, of the (broadly)
neo-Marxist of the s and early s. e same applies to the following, cru-
cial insight: “history-writing is always historiographical, not only because it is
always informed by the politics and ideologies of the moment in which histo-
rians choose their topics and interpretations […], but above all, because history-
writing is always underpinned by and infusedwith reigning philosophical and/or
metaphysical beliefs” ().is consideration, so strongly evocative of Benedeo
Croce’s idea of historiography, comes even closer to Gramsci’s political rework-
ing of this conception according to the assumption that the philosophy of praxis
is history, past, and in ﬁeri, thus politics. Finally, the ethical appeal to humanism
against forms of scientistic de-centralization of humanity and abdication of re-
sponsibility for the subject manifestly descends from the same intellectual and
political legacy.
Gramsci’s appeal to radical humanism, as the practical collective realization
of philosophical immanentism, loomes over the theses presented in Chapter
Ten. Here, Cooter castigates Latour’smaterial turn alongside the anti-humanistic
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implications of his Actor-Network eory. is theory, in fact, equates hu-
man agents, animals and material objects as knots of a network, resulting in
a “de-centralisation of humans and their actions”. It is against such vision, por-
trayed as a tendency toward de-huamnization and the undermining of sub-
jective agency, that Cooter remarks: “Passivity and amorality should have no
place, while self-reﬂexivity and political passion should have a great deal more”
().
1.5. The Foucauldian Present
Whereas Marxist references are quite timid in this volume, sometimes even
apologetic in their tone—according to the refrain “It felt right at the time” ()—
Foucault occupies a very prominent theoretical position. Cooter seems to regard
the passage from the one horizon (historical a priori?) to the other as a quasi-
necessity inscribed in the development of critical postures in historiography.
He assigns Michel Foucault the task of freeing theory from a series of pitfalls
and ambiguities of Marxism (not to mention vulgar socio-economical reduc-
tionism). As he claims, “e pre-‘postmodern’ Foucault—concerned with liber-
ating the revolutionary process from ritualized and dogmatized Marxism—had
[…] invited considerationwhether powerwas ‘always in a subordinated position
relative to economy’” (). On the one hand, Marxism incurred the naturaliza-
tion of society and “over-discreteness” in the distinction between culture and
society. On the other, Foucauldian discourse analysis avoided these problems
by assuming that “language [is not] separate[d] from a ‘real’ material world”
(). Accordingly, the a priori of history writing is a discursive regime of truth
corresponding to speciﬁc power relations, continuously mediated and recon-
ﬁgured. Whereas the Marxist discourse on ideology and cultural industry was
primarily concerned with politics investing the minds, Foucault opened up a
new dimension of power, namely the somatic (). is dimension ensures his
success amongmedical historians. Foucault’s considerations onmedicalization,
the concept of biopower (Chapter Nine) and the idea that the body is the center
of power relations (see especially Chapter Four) are in fact directly relevant to
their discipline.
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e central sections of the volume are largely informed by Foucauldian mo-
tives. Chapter Four speciﬁcally addresses the body-turn as a move from the pre-
vious essentialism of sociology to the Foucauldian discursive problematization
of the body “as a form of knowledge continually being invested and re-invested
in power relations” (). Chapters Five and Six deal with health posters from
the s (with scholarly work on them as well as exhibits). Against naive un-
derstandings of visual culture as something merely auxiliary to science (as a
form of top-down dissemination and education), Cooter and Stein argue that
images shall be treated as moments of a “discursive regime, not of universal
truth” (). To be sure, these remarks can be applied to the use of documents
and the appeal to facts in general. For instance, in Chapter Six Cooter and Stein
consider a museum exhibit of AIDS posters¹ that programmatically illustrated
their global dimension but, as a result, isolated them from their socio-cultural,
discursive environment. Instead, posters were reinserted in the new narrative
of globalization, which is itself highly ideological as a projection of the notion
of a “spatially transcendent capitalism—an economic system supposedly unfet-
tered by place or national boundary” (). Images, as the authors remind us,
emerge from political, intellectual, and emotional struggles for meaning (),
in which the local and not the global is the decisive aspect.
Cooter favors a historical and political reading of Foucault. erefore, al-
though he appreciates novel aempts directed toward a theoretical appropri-
ation and continuation of Foucault’s work, he strongly criticizes (in Chapter
Nine) conservative neo-liberal distortions marked by the intention of an apo-
litical usage of his theories, as well as by abstract philosophical theorizations
employing his categories.
¹ Against AIDS: Posters from Around the World, held at the Hamburg Museum ür Kunst und
Gewerbe (February-April ).
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1.6. Epistemology and Society
To sum up, two crucial issues emerge from Writing History in the Age of
Biomedicine. e ﬁrst one concerns epistemology. Cooter points out a mostly
unperceived neo-positivistic trend aﬀecting the theory of knowledge. It con-
sists in the substitution of historical epistemology—a perspective inseparably
connecting historical investigation and theoretical reﬂection on the object as
well as on the subject of historiography—for biological reductionism. A general
tendency to root epistemology in the brain is not innocent, as it disguises an
underlying conservative project. Neuro-reductionism, in fact, erodes historical
consciousness as well as the critical thought that is indissolubly linked to it.
A secondmajor point concerns the disappearance of society and politics from
the history of science andmedicine.While this development signals a conserva-
tive turn in the discipline, the social framework that led to this outcome remains
unclear. e passage from the collective Marxist intellectual of the Seventies,
who saw himself or herself as part of a vast political and cultural movement, to
the Foucauldian indignant but impotent academic ‘telling the truth’ against the
mainstream is a shi whose origin and meaning remain obscure if it is framed
only in moral terms. e internal dynamics of an academic discipline should
not only be related to scholars’ intentions or lack of criticism. Rather, it should
be understood as part of major socio-economical and political changes, namely
market-oriented societal restructuring in the post Cold War era and the revival
of liberal theories.
e vastness of the subject taken on in Writing History in the Age of Bio-
medicine transcends specialized shortsightedness. It raises the question of the
transformations of intellectual work and historiography in the present, while
asking whether and how the impetuous aﬃrmation of biomedicine aﬀects our
historical awareness. Many of the questions addressed are too fundamental to
be answered by one author in one book. ey require broad cultural debates.
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2. Questions and Answers
1 D Roger, I would like to begin our conversation with your—actually, notonly your—Foucauldian conversion. Although Foucault’s treatment andcriticism of power clearly has a political dimension, I tend to perceive the passagefrom the neo-Marxism of the s to the Foucauldian trend of the present as a loss
of collective capacity to look forward and shape our common future. It seems that
increasing emphasis on ethics and a generic sense of revolt replaced earlier forms
of political engagement. Do you not think that the disaggregation of the collective
dimension of intellectual engagement and the preeminence of individualistic crit-
icism mirrors the neo-liberal developments of the last decades (and possibly the
social-democratization of the le)?
e loss of a collectivist politics of the kind last seen in the s is indeed
a feature of neoliberal culture. However, I am not sure that is the same thing
as the loss of a collective dimension to intellectual life. ere was certainly a col-
lective intellectual buzz to the postmodern literary turn in the s among
feminist, gays, and other self-discovered subalterns. You could say that the po-
litical collective got broken down and distributed into many cells – all of them
very lively and collective in spirit as they challenged the new enemies of in-
tellectual progress (i.e., those who opposed poststructuralism). But what would
be more accurate to say is that the new topics for intellectual discussion in the
s and s sundered the old rationalizations for, and legitimacy of, collective
intellectual endeavour. e death of ‘the social,’ the rise of the Self and iden-
tity politics, and other poststructualist preoccupations mediated, or at least sat
comfortably with the ‘selﬁsh gene’ individualist ideology of neoliberalism¹.
But it would be historically short-sighted to lay the blame for this on post-
structuralism and postmodernism. e origins of the death of “collective-intel-
lectual-activity-as-collective-politics” go back as least as far as the invasion of
Hungary in . Disillusionment then with the supposed real politics of Soviet
socialism combined with ever-stronger faith in West in the belief (propaganda)
¹ See François Cusset, French eory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intel-
lectual Life of the United States (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, ).
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that individuals could change the world in a free society, found its way into a
variety if intellectual discourses. In history-writing its most famous expression
was in E.P. ompson’se Making of the English Working Class (), a work
that proclaimed the novel idea that ‘e working class made itself as much as it
was made.’ Ever aer, the history of peoples was seen as being about more than
merely modes of production and structures, as in the old economistic marxism.
Working people were no longer simply raw human material and blank minds
to be imposed upon; they were (or had the potential to become) the masters
of their own destiny. us here, ironically even within this most inspiring ex-
ample of social(ist) history writing, one can detect the roots of the self-centred
individualism of s. A ﬁnal twist in this dialectical understanding of funda-
mental change is that it was Foucault’s understanding of knowledge/power that
did most to enable us to see it. By calling into question social historians’ un-
derstanding of power as based upon the liberal-Marxist trinity of exploitation,
domination and oppression—those blocks to understanding ‘true reality’ and
liberation—Foucault helped us see that we are not only objects of disciplines
but also self-scrutinizing and self-forming subjects of our own knowledge¹.
2 U a theatrical metaphor, one can say that various characters comeon the stage of your book, and play diﬀerent roles, oen opposing one an-other. Marx enters it as the sadly missed ancestor, whereas Foucault acts the partof the anti-dogmatic exponent of a new generation of anti-dogmatic thinkers. Sim-
ilar to medieval Allegories, Vices and Virtues, appear in the drama as positive or
negative ﬁgures: Naturalization and Essentialism versus Discursiveness, Scientism
versus Historicity, and so on and so forth. Enlightenment, with her maids Reason
and Universalism, move on the scene as fraudulent illusionists, in spite of their
historical signiﬁcance as reference points for modern criticism. Some of the ﬁg-
ures look even more ambiguous. is is certainly the case with Ideology, which is
passé in spite of her eﬀorts to hide her popular origins (through a process of de-
vulgarization). Humanism stands out as the positive antagonist of Reductionism,
and Reiﬁcation as the defender of human freedom of decision and action. However,
¹ For elaboration see Roger Cooter and Claudia Stein, ‘Introduction: e Vicissitudes of Funda-
mental Change’ in Cooter and Stein, e History of Medicine: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies
(London/N.Y: Routledge, ).
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the question arises whether Humanism, as a category, can still play a role within
an anti-essentialist historicist perspective. How shall the calls for humanizing re-
sponsibility be reformulated from your anti-essentialist viewpoint? How shall we
deal with the inner ambivalence of categories such as reason and ideology?
ere are a lot of characters here; too many to account for individually. Per-
haps ‘dancers’ would be beer, all performing in a ballet that might be en-
titled the transformation of the reign of ideology to that of discourse. Inas-
much as they refer to humanism and its ﬁt to an anti-essentialist historicist
perspective, let me concentrate on that. First of all, ‘ﬁt’ is not the right word; it
over-determines the answer or preﬁgures it. I don’t see humanism—or ‘being
human’—as only an essentialist category, like ‘the body’, ‘society,’ or ‘history’; I
also regard it as an article of Enlightenment faith deserving our utmost nurture.
Sure, it was made up as a category during the Renaissance, and the study of that
is no less interesting than the making up of the current negatively-orientated
post-humanism. But we lose more than we gain by treating it intellectually only
as a historical construct; in fact, we lose ourselves, or rather, our faith in our-
selves as humans.Without that we are wholly vulnerable to those who, dancing
to neoliberal tunes, proclaim that we are no diﬀerent from non-humans (bac-
teria, tables, bombs) and can therefore dispense with the Enlightenment privi-
leging of human agency. Posthumanists’ think that is entirely possible that one
day we will have robotic selves. But in this they forget that the very idea of a
stable (essentialist) ‘sel’ reproducible for all time is a product of a particular
culture and not something that is universal.
Humanism has of course many stripes, but what they all have in common,
writes Kenan Malik (in the one of best book ever wrien on the subject, Man,
Beast and Zombie: What Science Can and Cannot Tell Us About Human Nature¹),
“is a desire to place human beings at the centre of philosophical debate, to glo-
rify human abilities, and to view human reason as a tool through which to
understand nature”. Ever since the Holocaust this has been thrown into doubt,
the faith in humans devalued, the idea of their inﬁnite possibility compromised.
e fabric of humanity has been corroded as a result. But why should we con-
tinue to lash ourselves as a consequence of what was, aer all, a historically
aberrant totalitarian ideology mired with would-be scientiﬁc racism? Unless,
¹ London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, .
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of course, it is in someone’s or something’s interest that we should; that we
should be turned in this way from subjects to objects. And of course it is in
someone’s interest: a neoliberal capitalist political order that doesn’t want peo-
ple to act like Enlightenment humans, wondering, questioning and criticizing,
but rather, wants them to submit to what is, which is made to seem the only
option, and a lovely one at that.
3 I your writings, Postmodernism has a markedly negative connotation.Along with Fredric Jameson, you regard it as the ideology and the “CulturalLogic” of contemporary capitalism. Since you deem biological neo-positivism to beits expression, as well, how do you judge the relationship between these two cultural
tendencies? Postmodernism seems to run in the opposite direction from the neuro-
logical reductionism that is occluding history writing. In fact, it has the appearance
of a sort of hyper-historicity; it is a dematerialized and depoliticized proliferation
of narratives. However, both strands—postmodernism and neo-positivism—have
common roots in the neo-liberal terrain and adhere to the “ideology of the end of
ideology”. Hence, the two extremes of heedless subjective relativism and neurolog-
ical objective positivism converge as they claim to be located beyond ethics and
politics.
Are they not two “mystiﬁed mediations” of the same reigning global capital-
ism? Are they perhaps two successive stages of one process, in which neo-scientism
supplants postmodernism as oﬃcial ideology?
As a neo-Marxist I couldn’t help adopt a rather negative aitude (a la Jame-
son and Eagleton) to postmodernism.at is fully apparent in the middle chap-
ters of my book. But as the introductions to those chapters and the later essays
make explicit, I was also undergoing a change of view. With Claudia Stein, I
began historically to reinterpret postmodernism. It was not as apolitical as its
exponents and critics maintained; in fact, it was quite as political as Marxism,
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it was merely a diﬀerent politics serving diﬀerent cultural times. I became in-
terested in understanding the construction of the self within that culture and
developing a critique of that understanding. e logic or the forms of thinking
in postmodernism were diﬀerent than anything that had existed in the past,
but it was pointless not to engage with it simply because it wasn’t Marxist. In-
deed, once one realized that its language was the same as that of contemporary
biology (manifestly so with regard to ‘reading the book of life’ in both DNA
laboratories of those of linguists) there was all the more reason to explore it as
a historian of contemporary biomedicine.
Today, ‘neo-scientism’ (although that is hardly the best word to characterize
what’s shaping what) has only the appearance of supplanting postmodernism
(but not, I think, installing itself as ‘oﬃcial ideology’, which remains neoliberal-
ism). One must understand that science, too, in the s went through the lin-
guistic turn; science never operates independent from the wider culture (which
is precisely the message that was hard won by historians and sociologists of
science from the s and which was furthered through postmodernism, but
which is now forgoen). Today, neuroscience and evolutionary biology only
appear as having supplanted postmodernism (in truth, poststructural thinking);
in fact, the current science is deeply postmodern in conceiving of people as not
in control of their will, and so on.
Of course biology remains basically big money; it’s not done for free, and big
bucks are to be made from it inside and outside the pharma industry. Which
is to say that the relationship between contemporary science and contempo-
rary capitalism remains straightforwardly that of making money. ere re-
mains lile of the anxiety over this that there was in the  and s when
it dawned on scholars (and much of the public) that scientists were not the
disinterested lot they purported to be. But the neo-Marxian conclusion of the
s is no longer so interesting—that science is the social relations of capital-
ist culture, or that under capitalism scientiﬁc knowledge is constitutive of the
hierarchical and unequal power relations embedded in the dichotomous pos-
itivist structuring (metaphysics) of science/society, fact/value, nature/nurture
and Truth/ideology. Far more intriguing today (to my mind at least) is the way
in which ‘life’ is being reduced to biology, and mind to brain. Biology is now
taken as theway to understand the self (and hence there is no call for something
as obscure as history as a means to this end; it can be relegated to a proﬁt-
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making entertainment industry). It is not capitalism and its power relations
that demand scrutiny here, but rather, the speciﬁc posthuman ‘neurocultural
futures’ in which it operates. Beckoned is a study of the nature of power un-
constrained by (but not indiﬀerent to) a Marxian script. at was the point of
Writing History in the Age of Biomedicine.
4 T problem of positivism raises the question about the function of themeta-discourse on science, whether philosophical or historical. Is the func-tion of HPS just celebration? e exaltation of science is the most marked culturaland philosophical trait of positivism. It takes the results of the present-day for
granted, bases the theory of knowledge on its results and produces theoretical as
well as cultural (political etc.) justiﬁcations for it. Indeed, parasitism can be very
remunerative, since a subordinate role with respect to sciences garnering wide so-
cial recognition makes fundraising easier also for ancillary disciplines.
What about historiography? While you convincingly stress the critical poten-
tial of the history of science and medicine, it is also patent that such critical use
is not very likely to meet with general approbation, nor to easily obtain ﬁnancial
support in a neo-liberal context where intellectuals are not expected to make prob-
lems. Paradoxically, your appeal to historicity and critical thought as the salvation
of the discipline might not be heard because your ‘vision’ cannot compete with a
historiography that is uncritical and celebratory of the status quo. Indeed, the po-
sition you stand for is out of the running. To be sure, mindless historical practice
would drown together with the society it mirrors. But can we really bet on such
eschatology? Or, rather, is it not the special task of the critical intellectual to con-
tribute to political change—this being precisely what makes his/her engagement
signiﬁcant, independent of concerns about the rescue of disciplines?
It is true that the critical position I stand for—an Enlightenment tradition—is
out of the running in the neoliberal marketplace wedded to reductive neuro-
science. I am, as it were, in the position of an anti-phrenologist in the mid-s
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when phrenology was at its cultural height. Critique has ‘run out of steam’,
Bruno Latour assures us, while his ‘sociology of associations’ (Actor Network
eory) and things like nonrepresentations and aﬀect theory serve eﬀectively
to intellectually mediate neoliberal economics. Poststructural/postmodern cri-
tique is usurped and bent (largely unwiingly) into rationales for the economic
order which undermine critique itself. But there is still political hope in the
academy. e weight of critical assessment of the neoliberal mess in the hu-
manities and the privatization of universities is mounting (e.g.MarinaWarner’s
recent piece in the London Review of Books, or Willem Halﬀman and Hans Rad-
der’s “e Academic Manifesto: From an Occupied to a Public University” in
Minerva []). e veil is being lied and political action called for – now
even among some of one’s colleagues who have hitherto preferred to bury
their head in the sand. I’m hopeful, even though as yet (to anticipate your next
question), the profound association between neuro-culture and neoliberalism
remains largely mystiﬁed, and the hip thing in historiography is towards bi-
ology, positivistically and ahistorically embraced as a source of autonomous
(culture-free) knowledge.
5 T problem of the cultural meaning of research-funding policies andstrategies is one of the most important issues you tackle. As you pointout, the crisis of the engaged intellectual is closely connected with the managerial-ization of academies and research institutions. Market-driven historiography, and
the competition between historiography and other disciplines shapes our thinking
and writing. It can be said that funding constraints are at the same time material
and intellectual limitations.
Is it not time for a public j’accuse denouncing the mechanisms of exploitation
and the power relations aﬀecting intellectual activity? is should be an inquiry
into the neo-liberal cultural regime, perhaps an analysis à la Boltanski on how
the novel spirit of capitalism is realized through the socio-cultural and economical
mechanisms of the present organization of culture.
As I see it, such a study should cover at least the following aspects: working con-
ditions (precarization of the research, short-term employment, contractual forms),
career mechanisms (research evaluation and the criterion of “productivity,” the
quantiﬁcation of the requirements for recruitment, survival and advance in the
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Academia), education politics (school and university reforms, the reshaping of the
curricula, the skills-orientedmodel of teaching, the ﬁgure of the student-customer),
editorial politics (marketing-oriented publishing, copyright, imposition of formal
criteria by publishing companies, blind refereeing), the formalization of the spaces
for debate (conference arenas, admission criteria to meetings, participation fees,
and mediatization), and, on the top of it, funding policies (the privatization of
teaching and research, the system of fellowships, the role of foundations). e aim
of such analysis would be a reﬂection on the nouvel esprit scientiﬁque based on
an understanding of the correspondence between a neo-capitalist restructuring of
education/research/humanities and neo-liberal values informing scientiﬁc prac-
tices.
One can ask further: What is the role of the intellectual in a context in which
all that is individual and results from competition is praised (e.g., individual pub-
lications counting more than co-authored ones) and in which all that is engaged
(politics and civil commitment) is downplayed to hobby status (or a private creed)
that can be harmful for one’s career (directly, because it retards scientiﬁc “pro-
ductivity,” or indirectly, for ideological reasons)?
I couldn’t agreemorewith your assessment and your practical hints, not least
with respect to funding and the need for intellectuals to regain control over it.
Universities have become simply sites for money making. Many intellectuals
wring their hands over this, as if it were merely a problem ‘over there’, and
not one that links intimately and pervasively to themselves by transforming
the nature of their thought in ways conducive to neoliberalism. e job of the
intellectual must be to unpick and describe the present in which we live, but
always with a view to its critique, as a means to its improvement. At the very
least, their role should be to provoke and/or inspire, like good art. But increas-
ingly intellectuals (especially in the social sciences) forsake critique and provide
mere apology forwhat is.at is their would-be utility in a utilitarian-made (ne-
oliberal) world. Others seem to be unwiingly bent on a return to something
like Scholasticism with its provision of endless exegesis in the stead of critique.
ey fail to see that they are politically determined actors. Under conditions
of posthumanism they happily forget that it is only man who makes up ideas
about his condition and then rationalizes them. Restoring the Enlightenment
idea that the proper study of mankind is man is a means to healthy critique,
not a throwback.
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But the age of the intellectual is probably past, especially the European intel-
lectual once feared by constituted authority. It might be possible to reconstitute
it but not on university sites as they presently stand. So long as schools of busi-
ness studies run the show and determine the virtue of its ‘calculations’ there is
no hope.
6 I a recent publication¹, you revisit the issue of neurological reductionismin the context of a “(broadly postmodern) culture and (broadly neoliberal)socioeconomic order”. In the same essay, you oﬀer a synthesis of the theoretical-historical problem of the neuro-turn: “It delegitimizes critique itself, at least as we
have known it since Marx” (). us, the name of the Ancestor comes promi-
nently back to the fore, as the teacher of critical thought and historicism or, beer,
of the reciprocal reinforcement of the two. You underscore “the insistence of the
young Marx that nothing is ever outside history, including our most abstract con-
ceptions of ourselves and our most abstract categories” ().is was the rationale
informing the ‘New Historicism’ of the s and even of the s. “is insight—
as you write—should only make us more aentive to the complicity of ‘theory’ in
the politics of intellectual production that is, to the fact that ‘theory’ is always a
priori inside reigning epistemologies and visible and invisible normativities. Just
as important, it should alert us to the seductive role of language in the political
negation of older forms of thinking—precisely, to wit, the kind of critical thinking
stemming from the early writings of Marx” (-).
Is this an appeal to rediscover the Marxist roots of criticism? Is this a call for
the revitalization of our political origins? It this the conclusion we shall draw from
your reﬂection on the parabola of the history of science and medicine in the last
three decades or so? You seem to suggest that it is time not only to reﬂect on our
post-modern cultural environment, but also to assess the gains and the losses in the
¹ “Neural Veils and the Will to Historical Critique. Why Historians of Science Need to Take the
Neuro-Turn Seriously”, Isis  (): -.
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development of critical thought itself—that is, to evaluate the path from Marx to
Foucault through Gramsci. What comes next? Is it not one of most urgent impera-
tives to create new bonds of solidarity and a new community in order to overcome
the impotence of individualized criticism limited to indignation?
A new collective project going beyond criticism seems to depend on the capacity
to bring together fragmented opposition to the present hegemonic discourse. In this
respect, how do you judge the role of intellectuals between subjective responsibility
and collective action?
It is not the historian’s job to guess the future, and every historian who has
tried has invariably ended up with egg on his face. In the article you refer to
I was seeking ﬁrst and foremost to li the veil on the fashionable turn among
historians to ‘the neuro’, to expose the way it undermines critical thinking.
is was not an appeal to rediscover the Marxist roots of criticism. Far from
it; following Joan W. Sco, my thinking was to align the young Marx and neo-
Marxism andGramscianism of the s and swith the critical thinking of the
‘literary turn’ of the s, in order thatwemight erase the supposed dichotomy
between Marx and Foucault and reinstate critique itself as the common subject
in need of defense. In quoting Marx on ‘nothing outside of history’ etc. I sought
only to underscore past intellectual unity of purpose—a unity worth clarifying
in order to reclaim the ﬁght for critique in an increasingly Scholastics-tending
world of intellectual bullshit.
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